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RESOLVING PLACEMENT AND FINANCING DISPUTES
UNDER THE EDUCATION FOR ALL HANDICAPPED
CHILDREN ACT OF 1975
The Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA) t pro-
vides state and local school boards with federal financial assistance in
educating handicapped children.2 EAHCA's primary goal is to ensure
that every handicapped child3 receives a "free appropriate public educa-
tion."4 The statute contemplates that in most situations an "appropri-
ate" educational setting is a daytime, classroom program where
handicapped and nonhandicapped children learn together.' When a
classroom placement is inappropriate for a particular child,6 EAHCA
obligates a participating state7 to provide the child with a free "appropri-
1. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 775 (1975) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-61
(1982)).
2. Note, Enforcing the Right of an "Appropriate" Education: The Education for All Handi-
capped Children Act of 1975, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1103, 1103 (1979); see also S. REp. No. 168, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 6, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1425, 1431 (revealing congres-
sional support for federal assistance in protecting the rights of handicapped children) [hereinafter
cited as SENATE REPORT].
3. EAHCA defines "handicapped children" as follows: "The term 'handicapped children'
means mentally retarded, hard of hearing, deaf, speech impaired, visually handicapped, seriously
emotionally disturbed, orthopedically impaired, or children with specific learning disabilities, who
by reason thereof require special education and related services." 20 U.S.C. § 1401(1) (1982).
4. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(18) (1982).
The term "free appropriate public education" mean special education and related services
which (A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction,
and without charge, (B) meet the standards of the State educational agency, (C) include an
appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school education in the State involved,
and (D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education program required
under section 1414(a)(5) of this title.
Id. See infra notes 23-25 and accompanying text (discussing statutory definitions and judicial inter-
pretations of "special education" and "related services").
5. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B). The statutory requirement that school officials ensure that, to the
maximum extent possible, handicapped and nonhandicapped children attend classes together is com-
monly known as the "least restrictive environment" or "mainstreaming" provision. See infra notes
33-34 and accompanying text (discussing statutory preference for "mainstreaming").
6. See infra notes 61-62 and accompanying text (discussing the appropriateness of residential
and nonresidential placement alternatives).
7. Only New Mexico has elected not to participate in the EAHCA program. See New Mexico
Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. New Mexico, 678 F.2d 847, 853 (10th Cir. 1982). The Tenth Circuit
noted that New Mexico's failure to accommodate handicapped students may nevertheless constitute
unlawful discrimination under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Id. See infra notes 56 & 58
and accompanying text (discussing § 504).
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ate" education in a residential' setting.9
Disputes frequently arise between parents and school officials over fi-
nancing the high costs of residential education.1" EAHCA provides a
series of procedural safeguards for resolving placement and financing dis-
putes.'" This Note focuses on federal court review of state administrative
decisions regarding placement of handicapped children in residential ed-
ucational facilities. Part I summarizes the substantive and procedural
rights of handicapped children under EAHCA.'2 Part II discusses the
availability of publicly funded residential placements and related serv-
ices.' 3 Part III examines financing disputes that accompany interim and
final placement decisions.' 4 This Note concludes that conventional
methods of resolving placement and financing disputes are inconsistent
with EAHCA's substantive guarantees' 5 and that the equitable approach
of Doe v. Brookline School Committee'6 is better-suited to balance the
substantial interests of school officials, parents, and children.' 7
I. EAHCA
Two federal court decisions predating EAHCA's enactment estab-
lished that handicapped children have a substantive constitutional right
to public education.' 8 These decisions, however, neither defined the obli-
gation of school officials to provide handicapped children with public ed-
8. The term "residential placement" means placement in a publicly or privately operated edu-
cational facility that provides handicapped children with 24 hour care. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.302
(1984).
9. 45 C.F.R. § 84.33(c)(3) (1984); see North v. District of Columbia Bd. of Educ., 471 F.
Supp. 136, 139 (D.D.C. 1979).
10. In 1985 the cost of maintaining an emotionally disturbed child at the Edgewood Children's
Center in Webster Groves, Missouri, was $86.95 per day for a residential program that included
special education.
11. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)-(d) (1982) (providing for resolution of placement and financing
disputes by local educational agencies); id. § 1415(e) (providing for state and federal court review of
administrative decisions).
12. See infra notes 18-60 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 69-111 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 112-18 and accompanying text.
16. 722 F.2d 910 (1st Cir. 1983).
17. See infra notes 119-30 and accompanying text.
18. See Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 875 (D.D.C. 1972); Pennsylvania Ass'n for
Retarded Children (PARC) v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 282-83 (E.D. Pa. 1972). The consti-
tutional significance of these two cases is, however, limited. See Note, supra note 2, at 1104 & n. 11;
Comment, The Handicapped Child's Right to a Free Appropriate Education: Defining the Limits of
Responsibility, 27 VILL. L. REV. 567, 571-76 (1982). PARC and Mills decided only that the exclu-
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ucation nor provided procedures to protect this right to a public
education.' 9 Congress enacted EAHCA in 1975 to remedy these
deficiencies.2"
A. Substantive Provisions
EAHCA provides local school boards with funding for the education
of handicapped children.2 The statute's fundamental substantive re-
quirement is that states provide each handicapped child with a "free ap-
sion of handicapped children from public schools violated their due process rights; they did not
establish standards or procedures to enforce these rights. See infra note 19 and accompanying text.
The Supreme Court's decision in San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I
(1973), further limited the constitutional impact of PARC and Mills. In Rodriguez, the Court re-
jected the argument that the right to a public education is a fundamental interest. Id. at 36; see
Comment, supra, at 575-76. Thus, a state seeking to exclude handicapped children from public
schools may defeat an equal protection challenge simply by establishing a rational basis for the
exclusion.
In Fialkowski v. Sharp, 405 F. Supp. 946 (E.D. Pa. 1975), the state of Pennsylvania argued that
on the basis of Rodriguez it could permissibly exclude mentally retarded children from its public
schools. The court rejected this narrow interpretation of Rodriguez, holding that there exists a con-
stitutional right to a certain minimum level of education. Id. at 958.
The court in Fialkowski addressed the interaction of two distinct issues: the right of handicapped
children to a public education, and the right of mentally retarded children to equal protection of the
law. With respect to the latter problem, the court suggested in dictum that retarded children may be
a suspect class and that courts must "strictly scrutinize" laws that treat them unequally. Id. at 958-
95 (dictum). The court further suggested that there may not be a rational basis for providing educa-
tion to most children while denying retarded children beneficial instruction. Id. at 959 (dictum).
Courts generally have declined in later decisions to hold that mentally retarded persons constitute
a suspect class. See, eg., Anderson v. Banks, 520 F. Supp. 472, 512 (S.D. Ga. 1982). Historical
patterns of discrimination against the mentally retarded, however, justify heightened or intermedi-
ate-level scrutiny of classifications discriminating against mentally retarded persons. Cleburne Liv-
ing Center, Inc. v. City of Cleburne, Texas, 726 F.2d 191, 196-98 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct.
427 (1984); accord Association for Retarded Citizens of North Dakota v. Olson, 561 F. Supp. 473,
490 (D.N.D. 1982).
19. Comment, supra note 18, at 577-78. The court in PARC ignored the issue of financing
altogether. The Mills court found that a lack of sufficient funds did not relieve the school district of
its constitutional obligation. The court ruled that "[t]he inadequacies of the District of Columbia
Public School System, whether occasioned by insufficient funding or administrative inefficiency, cer-
tainly cannot be permitted to bear more heavily on the 'exceptional' or handicapped child than the
normal child." Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. at 876.
20. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 1431-33 (observing that lack of financial resources
had prevented states from complying with court decisions recognizing rights of handicapped chil-
dren to an appropriate education and concluding that federal assistance is necessary).
21. EAHCA's principal funding section is 20 U.S.C. § 141 l(a)(1) (1982). This section provides
annual payments to each participating state equal to 40% of the national average per pupil public
school expenditures for each handicapped child receiving special education and related services in
the state. Id. § 1411 (a)(l)(B)(v). The statute also authorizes grants to states for such purposes as
training teachers and research projects. See, eg., id. §§ 1432-36, 1441-44.
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propriate public education,"'22 meaning "special education and related
services."'23  "Special education" is instruction designed "to meet the
unique needs of the handicapped child."24 "Related services" are serv-
ices "required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from special
education."25
The Supreme Court narrowly interpreted the requirement of a "free
appropriate public education" in Board of Education v. Rowley.26 The
Court examined the legislative history of EAHCA and concluded that
Congress merely intended states to provide handicapped children with
meaningful access to public education and did not intend to assure any
particular level of education.27 The Court therefore held that EAHCA
requires only that a participating state provide personalized instruction
and related support services.2" Lower federal courts have determined
that these services include necessary medical services that may be per-
formed by school nurses.29 Some courts have also held that school dis-
22. Id. § 1412(1); see supra note 4 (defining "free appropriate public education").
23. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(18) (1982); see supra note 4 (quoting § 1401(18)).
24. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(16) (1982). "The term 'special education' means specially designed in-
struction, at no cost to parents or guardians, to meet the unique needs of a handicapped child,
including classroom instruction, instruction in physical education, home instruction, and instruction
in hospitals and institutions." Id.
25. Id. § 1401(17).
The term "related services" means transportation, and such developmental, corrective,
and other supportive services (including speech pathology and audiology, psychological
services, physical and occupational therapy, recreation, and medical and counseling serv-
ices, except that such medical services shall be for diagnostic and evaluation purposes
only), as may be required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from special education,
and includes the early identification and assessment of handicapping conditions in children.
Id.
26. 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
27. Id. at 192 (citing SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 11).
28. Id. at 203. In particular, the Rowley Court concluded that EAHCA did not obligate the
state of New York to provide a sign language interpreter to assist a deaf child who had progressed
easily from grade to grade, but was not learning as much as she would with the interpreter's assist-
ance. Id. at 185-86. The Court limited its holding to the facts of the case and found Amy Rowley's
academic progress, considered in light of the special services and "professional consideration" af-
forded by the school administrators, to be dispositive. Id. at 203 n.25. For thorough discussions of
Rowley, see, eg., Zirkel, Building an Appropriate Education from Board of Education v. Rowley:
Razing the Door and Raising the Floor, 42 MD. L. REv. 466 (1983); Comment, Board of Education
v. Rowley: Handicapped Children are Entitled to a Beneficial Education, 69 IOWA L. REV. 279
(1983).
29. See Tatro v. Texas, 625 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1980), aff'd sub nom. Irving Indep. School Dist,
v. Tatro, 104 S. Ct. 3371 (1984). In Tatro, the parents of a four-year-old girl suffering from my-
elomeningocele, a birth defect commonly known as spina bifida, sought administration by school
personnel of a procedure known as Clean Intermittent Catheterization (CIC). CIC is a simple pro-
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tricts must extend the duration of instruction for handicapped children
beyond 180 days if a normal school calendar would prevent the proper
formulation of educational goals a0 for handicapped children.31
If a handicap is so severe that the child can benefit only from an educa-
tional program offered in a residential environment, EAHCA obligates
the state and the local school district to provide the program at no cost to
the child's parents or guardians.3 2 EAHCA discourages residential
placement by establishing a rebuttable presumption that handicapped
children can benefit from classroom education.33 This presumption may
cedure for manually draining the bladder and requires only 30 minutes of training. Id. at 558-59 &
n.3. The court held that CIC is a "related service" under EAHCA. Id. at 563-64.
The court established the following criteria for determining whether medical services qualify as
"related services" that must be performed by public schools: (1) the child must be handicapped and
require special education; (2) the service must be one that has to be performed during school hours
in order for the child to benefit from special education; and (3) the service must be one that a school
nurse or other similarly qualified person can perform. Id. at 562-63 (citing 45 C.F.R.
§ 121a.13(b)(4), (10) (1979)). The regulations cited by the Tatro court are now codified at 34 C.F.R.
§ 300.13(b)(4), (10) (1984); see also Tokarcik v. Forest Hills School Dist., 665 F.2d 443 (3d Cir.
1981) (following Tatro). Both Tokarcik and Tatro addressed the availability of free educational
services in the context of classroom settings. For a discussion of related services in residential pro-
grams, see infra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
30. The formulation of educational goals is a part of the Individualized Educational Program
(IEP) process. See infra notes 36-39 and accompanying text (discussing the cooperative IEP
process).
31. Crawford v. Pittman, 708 F.2d 1028, 1035 (5th Cir. 1983) ("Mississippi's policy of refusing
to consider or provide special education programs of duration longer than 180 days is inconsistent
with its obligations under [EAHCA]."); Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269, 280 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 452 U.S. 968 (1980) ("inflexibility of [Pennsylvania's] policy of refusing to provide more than
180 days of education [is] incompatible with [EAHCA's] emphasis on the individual"); see also
Tilton v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 705 F.2d 800, 804 (6th Cir. 1983) (transfer from year-round
program to 180 day program constituted an impermissible change of placement under EAHCA); cf.
Stanton v. Board of Educ. of Norwood Cent. School Dist., 581 F. Supp. 190, 194 (N.D.N.Y. 1983)
(allegation that school board failed to provide special summer services for handicapped children who
required a twelve-month educational program was actionable under EAHCA); see generally Note,
Application of Pennsylvania Department of Education's 180 Day Maximum School Year Policy to
Class of Handicapped Students Exhibiting "Regression-Recoupment" Phenomenon Violated "Free
Appropriate Public Education" Mandate of Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 54
TEMP. L.Q. 145 (1981) (discussing Battle); Note, Refusal to Provide Mentally Handicapped Children
with More than 180 Days of Education Per Year Violates Right to Appropriate Education Under the
Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 26 VILL. L. REv. 876 (1981) (similar).
32. 45 C.F.R. § 84.33(c)(3) (1984); see North v. District of Columbia Bd. of Educ., 471 F.
Supp. 136, 139 (D.D.C. 1979).
33. Turnbull, Brotherson, Wheat & Esquith, The Least Restrictive Education for Handicapped
Children: Who Really Wants It?, 16 FAM. L.Q. 161, 172-74 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Who Really
Wants It?]; see 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(5)(B), 1414(a)(1)(C)(iv) (1982); 34 C.F.R. § 300.550-.556 (1984);
see generally Turnbull, Brotherson, Czyewski, Esquith, Otis, Summers, Van Reusen & De Pazza-
Conway, A Policy Analysis of "Least Restrictive" Education of Handicapped Children, 14 RUTGERS
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be rebutted by demonstrating that classroom education is not appropri-
ate for the particular child.34 A court or state agency determination that
a residential placement is the only appropriate program for a child, how-
ever, is conclusive evidence that the placement is the "least restrictive
environment.
35
Individualized education of handicapped children is one of EAHCA's
principal goals. The child's individualized education program (IEP) im-
plements this goal.36 As envisioned by Congress, the IEP is more than a
document describing a final program;37 it is the culmination of a series of
negotiations between the child's parents and the school district.38 The
parties to IEP negotiations set annual goals for the handicapped child
and establish a program for attaining those goals.39
B. Procedural Provisions
EAHCA provides specific procedures for resolving disputes between
L.J. 489 (1983) (discussing relationship between educational, legal, and fiscal policies concerning
least restrictive education of handicapped children) [hereinafter cited as A Policy Analysis).
The statutory preference for mainstreaming has several bases: constitutional arguments, educa-
tional policy arguments, and economic arguments. The due process and equal protection clauses of
the fourteenth amendment limit the power of a state or local government to act "in any way that
curtails a citizen's liberty any more than necessary to accomplish its purposes." Who Really Wants
It?, supra, at 164; seeA Policy Analysis, supra, at 505-08. Mainstreaming arguably enhances a handi-
capped child's educational experience. See Who Really Wants It?, supra, at 169; A Policy Analysis,
supra, at 522-25; Comment, The Least Restrictive Environment Section of the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act of 1975: A Legislative History and Analysis, 13 GONz. L. REV. 717, 758-
59 (1978). In addition, mainstreaming is less expensive than residential placement. Id. at 759-60,
34. Who Really Wants It?, supra note 33, at 173; see also Hessler v. Maryland Bd. of Educ., 700
F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding that parents challenging the placement of their child in a public
school must demonstrate that the challenged placement is inappropriate within the terms of
EAHCA). An educational placement, however, is not inappropriate simply because another place-
ment would be more appropriate. Id. at 139; see infra notes 61-62 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the appropriateness of residential and nonresidential placement alternatives).
35. Kruelle v. New Castle County School Dist., 642 F.2d 687, 695 (3d Cir. 1981).
36. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(5) (1982); 34 C.F.R. § 300.533(b) (1984). For a thorough discus-
sion of the IEP process, see Note, Education of Handicapped Children: The JEP Process and the
Search for an Appropriate Education, 56 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 81 (1981).
37. Note, supra note 36, at 96.
38. Id.; see 34 C.F.R. § 300.340-.349 (1984).
39. Note, supra note 36, at 97. The Department of Education described the cooperative IEP
process as follows:
There are two main parts of the IEP requirement, as described in the Act and regulations:
(1) the IEP meeting(s), at which parents and school personnel jointly make decisions about
a handicapped child's educational program, and (2) the IEP document itself, which is a
written record of the decisions reached at the meeting.
Id. at 96 n.112 (quoting 46 Fed. Reg. 5460, 5462 (1981)).
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parents and school officials over the proper placement and program for
the child.' ° The school district must notify parents in advance of any
decision affecting the child's education,4' and it must provide the parents
with an opportunity to object to that decision.4 2 EAHCA entitles ob-
jecting parents to a hearing conducted by the school district.43 Either
party may appeal an unsatisfactory decision to the state educational
agency,' which must render a final decision within thirty days of the
date of appeal.45
EAHCA explicitly provides for judicial review by a state or federal
court.46 Generally, an "aggrieved" party must exhaust all available state
administrative remedies before seeking review by a federal district
court.47 Courts do not strictly require exhaustion of remedies, however,
and frequently waive the requirement if an administrative challenge ap-
pears futile.4"
Appeals from a state agency decision to a state court typically must
comply with a thirty-day statute of limitations.49 Most federal courts
40. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1982) (codifying the procedural due process rights of handicapped
children); infra notes 41-55 and accompanying text.
41. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(C) (1982).
42. Id. § 1415(b)(1)(E); 34 C.F.R. § 300.504-.505 (1984).
43. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2) (1982); 34 C.F.R. § 300.506-.508 (1984).
44, 34 C.F.R. § 300.512(b) (1984).
45. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c) (1982); 34 C.F.R. § 300.509-.510 (1984); see also John A. v. Gill, 565
F. Supp. 372, 380 (N.D. I11. 1983) (30-day deadline protects the handicapped child's right to a "free
appropriate public education" by limiting the time the child must remain in an allegedly inappropri-
ate placement). The 30-day statute of limitations, however, does not affect the period for appealing
final agency decisions to federal courts. See infra note 49-51 and accompanying text.
46. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1982); 34 C.F.R. § 300.511 (1984).
47. Eg., Smrcka v. Ambach, 555 F. Supp. 1227, 1234 (E.D.N.Y. 1983); see generally Hyatt,
Litigating the Rights of Handicapped Children to an Appropriate Education: Procedures and Reme-
dies, 29 UCLA L. REV. 1, 30-35 (1981) (discussing exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine
under EAHCA).
48. 121 CONG. REC. 37,416 (1975) (statement of Sen. Williams) (courts should not require
exhaustion if futile either as a legal or practical matter); see Christopher T. v. San Francisco United
School Dist., 553 F. Supp. 1107, 1115-16 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (court did not require exhaustion when
facts revealed a consistent refusal by the local school district to comply with provisions of EAHCA);
see also Monahan v. Nebraska, 645 F.2d 592, 597 (8th Cir. 1981) (court did not require exhaustion
when administrative remedies available could not provide plaintiffs with an adequate means for re-
dressing their grievances); cf. Riley v. Ambach, 668 F.2d 635, 641 (2d Cir. 1981) (court required
exhaustion when possibility existed that additional administrative proceedings would not prove fu-
tile). But see Ezratty v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 648 F.2d 770, 774-75 (1st Cir. 1981) (case
remanded to agency despite futility of additional administrative proceedings).
49. See, eg., TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a (Vernon Supp. 1982-83) (Administra-
tive Procedure and Texas Register Act). EAHCA does not address the timing of appeals of local
agency decisions to state or federal courts.
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hold that such a restrictive statute of limitations is inconsistent with
EAHCA's policy of encouraging parental involvement in planning the
child's educational program5" and instead apply the state statute of limi-
tations governing claims of negligent or wrongful acts.51
Federal court review of state administrative decisions must examine
both the extent of the state's compliance with EAHCA's procedural re-
quirements and the substance of the IEP.52 EAHCA provides a review-
ing court with broad remedial powers to fashion an appropriate
educational program for the child53 if the IEP fails to satisfy EAHCA's
minimum procedural requirements.5" If the IEP meets these require-
ments, a reviewing court will not judge the desirability of the program.55
Parents asserting the rights of their handicapped children to a benefi-
cial, publicly funded education may also file suit under section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 197356 and section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of
1871.5' Section 504 prohibits discrimination against any "otherwise
50. See Scokin v. Texas, 723 F.2d 432, 436 (5th Cir. 1984); Tokarcik v. Forest Hills School
Dist., 665 F.2d 443, 447-56 (3d Cir. 1981); Monahan v. Nebraska, 491 F. Supp. 1074, 1084-85 (D.
Neb. 1980), affd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 645 F.2d 592 (8th Cir. 1981); cf. Occidental
Life Insurance Co. of California v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355 (1977) (Supreme Court refused to bar an
enforcement action under the Equal Employment Opportunity Act filed after federal and state stat-
utes of limitations had expired). A 30-day period for appealing an administrative decision would
give parents insufficient time to evaluate and appeal the agency's decision. Tokarcik v. Forest Hills
School Dist., 665 F.2d at 452.
51. See Scokin v. Texas, 723 F.2d 432, 436 (5th Cir. 1984); Tokarcik v. Forest Hills School
Dist., 665 F.2d 443, 454 (3d Cir. 1981) (dictum).
52. Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982). The Supreme Court established a two-
part test for courts to employ in resolving suits brought under EAHCA. First, the state must have
complied with the procedures set forth in the Act. Second, the negotiated IEP must have been
reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits. Id. at 206-07.
53. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1982); see Hyatt, supra note 47, at 9. Specifically, section 1415(e)(2)
permits a reviewing court to "grant such relief as it determines is appropriate" after reviewing the
record of the agency proceedings and hearing "additional evidence at the request of a party." 20
U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1982).
54. Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207-08 (1982).
55. Id.; see Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1062 (6th Cir. 1983).
56. Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 394 (1973) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794
(1982)). Section 504 provides in part:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, as defined in section
706(7) of this title shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participa-
tion in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving federal financial assistance. ...
29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
57. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1982)). Section 1983 provides in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of
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qualified handicapped individual" in the administration of "any program
or activity receiving federal financial assistance." 58 Section 1983 protects
the due process and equal protection rights of the handicapped child and
provides a remedy for any deprivation of rights, privileges, and immuni-
ties under federal law.59 EAHCA's specificity in guaranteeing both the
substantive and procedural rights of handicapped children in educational
matters, however, gives it primary importance in this area.6'
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States. . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
A person seeking to recover monetary damages in a private action may, with varying success, use
either § 504 or § 1983. See Hyatt, supra note 47, at 51-61.
58. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982); see supra note 56 and accompanying text; see also John A. v. Gill,
565 F. Supp. 372, 384 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (enumerating the elements of a cause of action under § 504).
For cases recognizing that private damages under § 504 are consistent with the purpose of
EAHCA and are therefore not foreclosed by the existence of a remedy under EAHCA, see Meiner v.
Missouri, 673 F.2d 969 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 909 (1982); Christopher N. v. McDaniel,
569 F. Supp. 291 (N.D. Ga. 1983); Patsel v. District of Columbia Bd. of Educ., 530 F. Supp. 660
(D.D.C. 1982); see also Recent Case, Damages are Available under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act as a Necessary Remedy for Discrimination Against an Otherwise Qualified Handicapped Individ-
ual; Damages are not "Appropriate Relief " However, Under the Education for All Handicapped Chil-
dren Act: Meiner v. Missouri. 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 697 (1982). But see Darlene L. v. Illinois State Bd.
of Educ., 568 F. Supp. 1340 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (no § 504 remedy available where defendants have not
violated EAHCA); Manecke v. School Bd. of Pinekas County, Florida, 553 F. Supp. 787 (M.D. Fla.
1982) (no § 504 remedy available because there is relief available under 45 C.F.R. § 80.3 (1982) in
the form of termination of funding to institutions guilty of discrimination).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
Plaintiffs have traditionally fared very poorly under § 1983 in obtaining monetary damages in
educational placement disputes. Courts have generally refused to recognize § 1983 actions seeking
enforcement of EAHCA's provisions, holding that EAHCA's more comprehensive scheme indicates
a congressional intent to preclude enforcement suits brought under § 1983. Rollison v. Biggs, 567 F.
Supp. 964, 970 (D. Del. 1983); see Scokin v. Texas, 723 F.2d 432, 440-41 (5th Cir. 1984); Anderson
v. Thompson, 658 F.2d 1205, 1217 (7th Cir. 1981). The court in Christopher N. v. McDaniel, 569
F. Supp. 291 (N.D. Ga. 1983), however, suggested that it would have awarded monetary relief if the
plaintiff had established a § 1983 cause of action. Id. at 298; see also Hyatt, supra note 47, at 24-29
(11983 contemplates a cause of action for deprivation of rights, privileges and immunities secured
by federal "laws" such as EAHCA); cf. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980) (permitting petitioner
who challenged state AFDC benefits decision under § 1983 to recover attorney's fees under 42
U.S.C. § 1988). For a discussion of the availability of attorney's fees under § 1983 and § 504, see
infra note 60.
60. Rollison v. Biggs, 567 F. Supp. 964, 970 (D. Del. 1983). The Rollison court denied the
plaintiff's request for attorney's fees under § 505(b) of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794a(b)
(1982), noting that the relief sought by the plaintiffs under § 504 was available under EAHCA. 567
F. Supp. at 970; accord Smith v. Robinson, 104 S. Ct. 3457 (1984) (Rehabilitation Act attorney's fees
provision inapplicable if remedy is available under EAHCA). With respect to the plaintiffs' § 1983
claim, the court agreed with the plaintiffs that EAHCA, as a law of the United States, comes within
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II. THE HANDICAPPED CHILD'S SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT TO A
RESIDENTIAL EDUCATIONAL PLACEMENT
A school district must finance a residential educational placement for a
handicapped child upon a showing by the child's parents that such a
placement is the only "appropriate" placement. 61  The court will not
consider residential alternatives if a nonresidential educational placement
satisfies EAHCA's guarantee of a "free appropriate public education. '62
A demonstration that a handicapped child cannot benefit from a non-
residential education does not obligate the school district to pay all the
costs of a residential placement. EAHCA requires only that the school
district pay for "special education ' 63 and "related services."'6 Further-
more, the school district may refuse to pay for the residential placement
the ambit of § 1983. Id. (citing Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980)); see supra note 59. The court
held, however, that EAHCA's comprehensive remedial scheme indicates a congressional intent to
preclude enforcement suits pursuant to § 1983. 567 F. Supp. at 970 (citing Middlesex County Sew-
erage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1982)); see generally Note, Preclusion of
Section 1983 Causes of Action by Comprehensive Statutory Remedial Schemes, 82 COLUM. L. REV.
1183 (1982).
Parties to § 504 and § 1983 actions have on occasion persuaded courts to award attorney's fees,
which are not generally available under EAHCA. Rollison v. Biggs, 567 F. Supp. 964, 967-68 (D.
Del. 1983); see Hyatt, supra note 47, at 61-64. For cases awarding attorney's fees in § 504 actions,
see Rollison v. Biggs, 567 F. Supp. at 968-69 (party may recover attorney's fees only when the § 504
claim is more than a mere restatement of the EAHCA claim); Patsel v. District of Columbia Bd. of
Educ., 530 F. Supp. 660, 666 (D.D.C. 1982). But see Department of Educ. v. Katherine D., 727
F.2d 809, 820-21 (9th Cir. 1983); Hines v. Pitt County Bd. of Educ., 497 F. Supp. 403, 409
(E.D.N.C. 1980). Parties to § 1983 actions have been less successful in recovering attorney's fees.
For cases denying attorney's fees for § 1983 actions, see Department of Educ. v. Katherine D., 727
F.2d at 819-20; Rollison v. Biggs, 567 F. Supp. at 970-72. But see Monahan v. Nebraska, 687 F.2d
1164 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1012 (1983).
61. Hessler v. Maryland Bd. of Educ., 700 F.2d 134, 139 (4th Cir. 1983); see supra note 33 and
accompanying text (discussing EAHCA's rebuttable presumption that mainstreaming is "appropri-
ate"). The Supreme Court emphasized this point in Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 179 (1982),
holding that EAHCA only guarantees a handicapped child a beneficial education, not an optimal
educational program. Id. at 201; see supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text. Accordingly, a
court will order a residential placement only when the child cannot benefit from any other educa-
tional program.
Department of Education regulations contemplate the availability of alternative educational place-
ments ranging from regular classes to instruction in hospitals and institutions. 34 C.F.R. § 300.551
(1984); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.14 (1984) (describing alternative placements).
62. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1) (1982); see Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1062 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 196 (1983).
63. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(18) (1982); see supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text (quoting statu-
tory definition).
64. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(18) (1982); see supra notes 23 & 25 and accompanying text (quoting statu-
tory definition).
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altogether if services that do not qualify for funding constitute the princi-
pal reason for the child's placement.6 5
Disputes over whether a particular residential program satisfies
EAHCA's requirement of an "appropriate public education" generally
focus upon the program's related services. Many related services necessi-
tating a residential program are noneducational.66 Some courts recog-
nize that therapeutic services addressing the child's medical, social, and
emotional needs are critical components of the learning process and thus
are not severable from educational services.67 The severability of
noneducational and educational services depends upon whether the par-
ticular placement is the product of educational necessity or medical, so-
cial, or emotional problems that are not related to the learning process.68
65. See McKenzie v. Jefferson, 566 F. Supp. 404 (D.D.C. 1983). The court in McKenzie ad-
dressed the question whether a school district had to fund a residential facility placement for a child
who had suffered a mental breakdown. Because the reasons for the child's placement were primarily
medical, not educational, the court held that the school district did not have to finance the place-
ment. Id. at 412-13.
66. For example, medical services only qualify as related services when provided for "diagnos-
tic and evaluative purpose." 20 U.S.C. § 1401(17) (1982). Furthermore, only a licensed physician
may render "medical services." 34 C.F.R. § 300.13(4) (1983).
These definitional limitations often lead courts to seize upon subtle or unrealistic distinctions in
resolving placement disputes. Thus, while a psychologist's therapeutic efforts constitute "related
services," a psychiatrist's services do not. See Darlene L. v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 568 F. Supp.
1340, 1344 (ND. Ill. 1983); McKenzie v. Jefferson, 566 F. Supp. 404, 409-11 (D.D.C. 1983). While
the practices of the two professions differ substantially-for example only a psychiatrist may pre-
scribe medication-both can treat many conditions with equal success. Given the clarity of the
statutory language, it remains for Congress to devise a more realistic approach, one that predicates
state funding of a child's treatment on the nature of his or her condition, rather than on the profes-
sional background of the therapist.
67. See Kruelle v. New Castle County School Dist., 642 F.2d 687, 694 (3d Cir. 1981); North v.
District of Columbia Bd. of Educ., 471 F. Supp. 136, 141 (D.D.C. 1979).
68. Kruelle v. New Castle County School Dist., 642 F.2d at 693. The distinction between
educational and noneducational services obviously is vague, given the close relationship of the handi-
capped child's medical, social, and emotional problems to his or her educational problems. See id. at
694; North v. District of Columbia Bd. of Educ., 471 F. Supp. 136, 141 (D.D.C. 1979). Therapy
addressing emotional and social problems is frequently a prerequisite to learning. See Christopher T.
v San Francisco Unified School Dist., 553 F. Supp. 1107, 1119-20 (N.D. Cal. 1982); North v. Dis-
tnct of Columbia Bd. of Educ., 471 F. Supp. at 140-41. The court in North observed that Ty North's
combination of needs deserved the attention of two separate agencies: the Board of Education and
the Department of Human Resources. Because the antiquated laws of the District of Columbia
prevented the court from apportioning the financial obligation according to the child's needs, the
court resolved this bureaucratic dispute by invoking EAHCA's requirements and placing the entire
financial burden on the local school board. Id. at 141. Still, effective interagency cooperation to
remedy and prevent problems such as the one in North remains possible. Stoppleworth, Mooney &
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III. ASSIGNING FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR A RESIDENTIAL
PLACEMENT IN A DISPUTED CASE
A. Initial Financial Responsibility: During the Pendency of Judicial
Review
Section 1415(e)(3) requires that a handicapped child remain in his or
her "then current educational placement" during the pendency of admin-
istrative or judicial review. 9 This provision prevents a legal dispute over
placement from disrupting the child's educational program.7"
Most courts interpret section 1415(e)(3) as providing an "automatic
stay," which terminates public funding to parents who change the place-
ment of their handicapped child without the approval of school offi-
cials.7 Courts adopting this interpretation will not order the school
district to finance an unapproved placement during the pendency of liti-
gation between school officials and parents over the proper placement of
the child. These courts will, however, order the school district to con-
tinue paying for the education of a handicapped child of parents who
resist the efforts of school officials to revise the child's IEP to provide for
a different placement.72 Parents who unilaterally place their child in an
unapproved setting must therefore bear the total cost of educating the
child until the school district acquiesces in the unapproved setting73 or a
state educational agency or a reviewing court resolves the placement
dispute.
The "automatic stay" theory frequently presents parents with a diffi-
Arronson Revisited: A Less Than Solomon-Like Solution to the Problem of Residential Placement of
Handicapped Children, 15 CONN. L. REV. 757, 764-65 (1983).
The need for cooperation among different agencies will increase in the future. Advances in medi-
cal science save the lives of many children with multiple disabilities that would have been fatal a few
years ago. "The result is a lesser proportion of children with a single, uncomplicated disability and a
greater proportion of children whose development is complicated by a number of handicaps." S.
KIRK & J. GALLAGHER, EDUCATING EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 417-18 (4th ed. 1983).
69. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3) (1982).
70. See, e.g., Doe v. Anrig, 692 F.2d 800, 810 (1st Cir. 1982).
71. See Marvin H. v. Austin Indep. School Dist., 714 F.2d 1348, 1350 (5th Cir. 1983); Stacey
G. v. Pasedena Indep. School Dist., 695 F.2d 949, 953-54 (5th Cir. 1983); Smrcka v. Ambach, 555 F.
Supp. 1227, 1234 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). But see Doe v. Brookline School Comm., 722 F.2d 910, 919 (Ist
Cir. 1983) (rejecting "automatic stay" theory in favor of a more equitable approach); infra notes 78-
84 and accompanying text.
72. See Vander Malle v. Ambach, 673 F.2d 49, 52 (2d Cir. 1982). Courts do not consider the
child's initial placement unapproved if the school district unilaterally attempts to revise the child's
IEP to provide for a new placement. The child's parents may demand that the school district con-
tinue to fund the initial placement pending final arrangements. Id.
73. See Jacobsen v. District of Columbia Bd. of Educ., 564 F. Supp. 166 (D.D.C. 1983).
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cult choice. Parents dissatisfied with a state-funded placement must
either leave their child in an educational setting they consider inappro-
priate or unilaterally enroll their child elsewhere and risk assuming the
costs of his or her education during ensuing litigation.74 Parents oppos-
ing the school district's efforts to move the child from a residential facil-
ity to a nonresidential facility may simply file an appeal and thus obtain a
temporary continuation of a perhaps inappropriate publicly financed
placement." In either event, the automatic stay subverts the cooperative
IEP process76 and undermines Congress' goal of a "free appropriate pub-
lic education" for all handicapped children."
The First Circuit recently rejected the "automatic stay" theory in
favor of a more sensible approach to allocating interim placement costs
during judicial review of the child's IEP. The court in Doe v. Brookline
School Committee7" suggested that the party wishing to move the child
from an approved placement should ask for a preliminary injunction.79
Relying on its equitable powers to fashion "appropriate relief,"8 a court
74. Once litigation over the child's educational placement has concluded the parents may,
under strictly limited circumstances, win reimbursement of interim educational expenses. See infra
notes 86-87, 94-102, & 105-11 and accompanying text.
75. See Vander Malle v. Ambach, 673 F.2d 49, 52 (2d Cir. 1982); supra note 72 (discussing
Vander Malle).
76. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text (Congress envisoned the IEP process as a
series of negotiations between parents and school officials and did not intend for any one party to
dominate the proceedings). The court in Doe v. Brookline School Comm., 722 F.2d 910 (1st Cir.
1983), characterized the unilateral efforts of parents to defeat the cooperative IEP process as a "pri-
vate appropriation of public monies." Id. at 916.
77. During the pendency of litigation, parents must therefore choose between either a "free" or
an "appropriate" education for their handicapped child, despite EAHCA's substantive guarantees.
78. 722 F.2d 910 (1st Cir. 1983).
79. Id. at 919. This "preliminary injunction" theory represents the logical continuation of ear-
her decisions exhibiting similar equitable approaches, see Stacey G. v. Pasadena Indep. School Dist.,
695 F.2d 949. 955 n.5 (5th Cir. 1983); Town of Burlington v. Department of Educ. of Mass., 655
F.2d 428, 432-34 (1st Cir. 1981) (Burlington 1), and a repudiation of Doe v. Anrig, 692 F.2d 800 (1st
Cir. 1982) (Anrig I), which employed the "automatic stay" theory.
In Anrig 1, the parents of a handicapped child successfully challenged the school district's efforts
to move their child from a residential program to a public school program. The First Circuit held
that EAHCA did not authorize reimbursement of the parents' expenses in maintaining their child in
the residential program during the litigation and accordingly remanded the case to the district court.
Id. at 813. In Brookline, however, the First Circuit held that reimbursement of interim placement
costs is appropriate in circumstances such as those in Anrig L Doe v. Brookline School Comm., 722
F.2d at 921. On remand, the district court in Anrig thus awarded reimbursement to the child's
parents. Doe v. Anrig, 561 F. Supp. 121 (D. Mass. 1983) (Anrig H). The First Circuit affirmed.
Doe v. Anrig, 728 F.2d 30, 32 (Ist Cir. 1984) (following Brookline).
80. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1982); supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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then may employ traditional standards in ruling on the motion." The
court's ruling will establish the child's appropriate interim educational
placement and obligate the school district to finance this placement while
litigation on the merits of the dispute is pending.
This "preliminary injunction" theory protects the cooperative IEP
process by denying either party the improper advantage that might result
from an automatic stay of all placement and financing obligations. 82
Furthermore, the Brookline approach prevents "private appropriation of
public monies"" and avoids misuse of EAHCA's procedural guaran-
tees84 by enabling courts to resolve placement disputes on the basis of the
child's interests, rather than a narrow reading of statutory language.
B. Ultimate Financial Responsibility: Reimbursement and
Compensation
Interim placement and financing decisions have no bearing on the ulti-
mate disposition of placement costs.8 Some courts hold that EAHCA
neither provides for nor bars reimbursement of interim costs after litiga-
tion over the child's placement has concluded. In the absence of explicit
statutory language, these courts have looked to alternative sources of re-
lief, such as section 504 and section 1983, and have concluded that
EAHCA does not bar reimbursement of most interim costs to parents
who successfully challenge the placement of their child.86 The only cir-
cumstance precluding reimbursement arises when parents unilaterally
move their child from a public to a private placement. 87
81. 722 F.2d at 917. A court ruling on a motion for a preliminary injunction usually considers
both the likelihood that the moving party will win on the merits and the likelihood that the moving
party will sustain irreparable harm absent injunctive relief. Id. See Town of Burlington v. Depart-
ment of Educ. of Mass., 655 F.2d 428, 432-34 (1st Cir. 1981).
82. 722 F.2d at 921; see supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text (discussing the problems
arising under the "automatic stay" theory).
83. 722 F.2d at 916; see supra note 76 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
85. Christopher N. v. McDaniel, 569 F. Supp. 291, 298 (N.D. Ga. 1983). The type of theory
applied in determining the educational placement of the handicapped child during the pendency of
appeal proceedings is irrelevant to the problem of assigning ultimate financial responsibility.
86. See Meiner v. Missouri, 673 F.2d 969, 978 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 909 (1982);
Christopher N. v. McDaniel, 569 F. Supp. 291, 298 (N.D. Ga. 1983); see also supra notes 56-60 and
accompanying text (describing causes of action under § 504 and § 1983).
87. See Scokin v. Texas, 723 F.2d 432, 438 (5th Cir. 1984); Hessler v. Maryland Bd. of Educ.,
700 F.2d 134, 138 (4th Cir. 1983); Cain v. Yukon Pub. Schools, Dist. 1-27, 558 F. Supp. 605, 610
(W.D. Okla. 1983); Smrcka v. Ambach, 555 F. Supp. 1227, 1234 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). The First Circuit
adopted a flexible approach to this issue in Brookline, noting that a party may forfeit its right to
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Courts generally hold that EAHCA does not authorize an award of
damages." First, EAHCA does not contain a general damages provi-
sion. Second, courts construe the language of section 1415(e)(2), provid-
ing for "such relief as the court determines is appropriate,"89 as justifying
only prospective injunctive relief.' Third, the legislative history con-
tains no indication that Congress intended a damages remedy under
EAHCA.9 t Finally, damage awards would force school districts to ex-
pend a large share of their limited resources for noneducational pur-
poses.9 2 Many courts similarly interpret EAHCA to preclude damage
awards under sections 504 and 1983. 91
Some courts recognize narrow exceptions to the general rule preclud-
ing damages under EAHCA. The Seventh Circuit held in Anderson v.
Thompson94 that at least two exceptional situations warrant a damage
award: (1) when the placement offered by the school district would have
endangered the child's physical health;95 and (2) when the school district
acted in bad faith by failing to comply with EAHCA's procedural provi-
sions.96 Parents successfully invoking one of these exceptions are entitled
to reimbursement for the cost of services that the school district should
have paid.97 The Ninth Circuit has added a third exception in situations
reimbursement by unilateral action that seriously violates EAHCA's procedural provisions. 722 F.2d
at 921. Nevertheless, in Town of Burlington v. Department of Educ., 736 F.2d 773 (1st Cir. 1984),
cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 562 (1984) (Burlington II), the court explained that Brookline "implicitly
recognized . . the validity of parents making a unilateral move to fund educational services pend-
ing review and of the parents' right to receive reimbursement at final judgment if they are held to
have acted appropriately." Id. at 797.
88. See, e.g., Marvin H. v. Austin Indep. School Dist., 714 F.2d 1348, 1356 (5th Cir. 1983)
("appropriate relief' under § 1415(e)(2) does not include damages). But see Ezratty v. Puerto Rico,
648 F.2d 770, 775-76 (1st Cir. 1981) (administrative agencies may grant monetary relief in some
circumstances); infra notes 94-99 and accompanying text (exceptions to the no damages rule).
89. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1982); see supra note 53 and accompanying text.
90. See, e.g., Marvin H. v. Austin Indep. School Dist., 714 F.2d at 1356. But see Doe v. Brook-
line School Comm., 722 F.2d 910, 912 (1st Cir. 1983); infra notes 103-107 and accompanying text
(holding that § 1415(e)(2) authorizes retroactive reimbursement of interim placement costs to pre-
vailing party).
91. Anderson v. Thompson, 658 F.2d 1205, 1211 (7th Cir. 1981).
92. Id. at 1212-13 (citing 121 CoNG. REC. 25,531 (1975) (statement of Rep. Quie)).
93 See cases cited supra note 60.
94. 658 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1981).
95. Id. at 1213-14; see Tatro v. Texas, 625 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1980), aff'd sub nom. Irving
Indep. School Dist. v. Tatro, 104 S. Ct. 3371 (1984); see also supra note 29 (discussing Tatro).
96 Anderson v. Thompson, 658 F.2d at 1214; see Doe v. Anrig, 561 F. Supp. 121, 128-29 (D.
Mass. 1983), aff'd, 728 F.2d 30 (1st Cir. 1984) (Anrig 11).
97. The Anderson court explicitly rejected the possibility that EAHCA authorizes tort dam-
ages. 658 F.2d at 1213 n.12.
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when the school district inexplicably fails to offer a classroom placement
to a child who has clearly demonstrated his or her ability to function in a
classroom environment.9" Under this exception, parents may recover the
costs of private education that accrued before the parties devised an ap-
propriate educational program.99
The court in Thornock v. Evans " rejected these narrow exceptions
and created an "equitable catch-all" exception to the rule that EAHCA
does not authorize an award of damages.101 In Thornock, the court or-
dered a school district to pay for a teaching assistant. The court relied
upon an "equitable catch-all" exception to extend retroactively the
school district's financing obligation to the date the proceedings com-
menced.1"2 This broad exception to the no-damages rule is a sensible
approach to the question of reimbursement to parents for the costs of
providing an "appropriate education" for their child during review of a
school district's decision not to provide a necessary service.
In Doe v. Brookline School Committee,103 the First Circuit went a step
beyond Thornock and rejected Anderson. 4 The Brookline court held
that a party who loses on the merits in a dispute over a child's educa-
tional placement must reimburse the prevailing party for its interim
placement costs.10 5 The court observed that section 1415(e)(2) not only
creates a private right of action for "aggrieved" parties, but also explic-
itly authorizes "such relief as the court determines is appropriate." 10 6
According to the First Circuit, "appropriate" relief includes reimburse-
98. Department of Educ. v. Katherine D., 727 F.2d 809, 815-17 (9th Cir. 1983).
99. Id.
100. No. 78-709 (Idaho Dist. Ct. April 4, 1983), 7 MDLR 236-37 (1983).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. 722 F.2d 910 (1st Cir. 1983).
104. Id. at 919; see supra notes 94-102 and accompanying text (discussing exception to the no
damages rule).
105. 722 F.2d at 921. The First Circuit rejected its earlier decision in Doe v. Anrig, 692 F.2d
800 (1st Cir. 1982) (Anrig I), which denied reimbursement to parents who later prevailed on the
merits of their case. Id. at 812; see supra note 79.
In Town of Burlington v. Department of Educ., 736 F.2d 773 (1st Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S.
Ct. 562 (1984), the First Circuit authorized reimbursement of interim placement costs to the prevail-
ing party even though the parents unilaterally moved their child from an approved placement to an
unapproved placement. The court observed that the parents and the local school district agreed that
the child's initial placement was inappropriate and disagreed only over the proper setting of an
appropriate program. Id. at 779; see supra note 87.
106. 722 F.2d at 919; see supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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ment of interim Costs. 10 7
Permitting reimbursement to the prevailing party promotes EAHCA's
purpose and policy. 108 The prospect of reimbursement will encourage
parents to protect their child's rights assiduously. 10 9 At the same time,
the parties to the dispute will know in advance that they will bear the
costs of impulsive, unfounded actions or excessive recalcitrance. 10
Thus, the Brookline approach strikes an effective and appropriate
balance.
Courts have prudently limited reimbursement to costs actually in-
curred by the prevailing party.I" Judicial recognition of a general dam-
ages remedy would be inconsistent with EAHCA's role as a compromise
between the needs of disabled children, the inherent difficulties in educat-
ing children with special needs, and the budgetary constraints facing
school districts.
IV. CONCLUSION
The conventional approach to financing residential education for
handicapped children during judicial review of their IEPs requires major
reform. Courts employing the "automatic stay" theory" 2 in determining
the child's educational placement during the pendency of review simply
lock the child into a placement at an arbitrary moment, regardless of that
placement's appropriateness."t 3  When the placement is inappropriate,
the "automatic stay" interpretation may obstruct enforcement of
107. 722 F.2d at 919. The court observed that such an interpretation provides courts with
.'maximum flexibility" to effectuate EAHCA's remedial objective. Id. See SENATE REPORT, supra
note 2, at 1430 (purpose of EAHCA is to provide maximum benefits to handicapped children and
their families).
108. 722 F.2d at 921. If parents are incorrect in their claim that the IEP provides an inappropri-
ate education for their child, they, like parents of nonhandicapped children, should bear the financial
burden of giving their child a private education. If, however, the school board's decision to place the
child in a classroom setting was inappropriate, then reimbursement restores parents to the position
Congress intended. Id.
109. Id.
110 Id.
Ill. Id. at 920; see Anderson v. Thompson, 658 F.2d 1205, 1213 n.12 (7th Cir. 1981) (rejecting
tort damages under EAHCA); supra note 97. Possible eleventh amendment problems exist with
requiring the state to reimburse parents. Ezratty v. Puerto Rico, 648 F.2d 770, 775-76 (1st Cir.
1976). But see Department of Educ. v. Katherine D., 727 F.2d 809, 819 (9th Cir. 1983) (a state
waives its eleventh amendment immunity when it chooses to participate in a federally funded pro-
gram such as EAHCA).
112. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
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EAHCA's substantive requirements for several years. 114  Such a delay
could inflict irreparable harm upon children who must maximize the use
of their limited period of eligibility 1 5 to obtain some measure of personal
independence."16 Furthermore, courts that order reimbursement for the
child's interim educational expenses only in exceptional circumstances 17
narrowly interpret EAHCA as guaranteeing a "free appropriate public
education" only when parents and school officials agree from the com-
mencement of negotiations on the appropriate educational placement for
the child. When the parties disagree, courts following Anderson and its
progeny hold that the ultimate financial responsibility for the child's edu-
cation during review of his or her IEP rests upon the party who hap-
pened to be paying for the child's placement when the dispute arose.' 18
The Brookline approach is much more sensible.' 19 A court employing
this approach will invoke its statutory grant of equitable powers' 20 in an
attempt to ensure that the child's educational placement during review
will be sustained upon a full review of the merits.' 2 ' This approach re-
spects EAHCA's preference for maintaining the child's placement 122 by
requiring the party seeking to change the child's placement to bear the
substantial burden of demonstrating the need for a preliminary injunc-
tion.'23 The availability of injunctive relief to remedy a patently inappro-
priate educational placement will also reduce the problems raised by
parents who abandon the cooperative IEP process and unilaterally place
114. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
115. A handicapped child is eligible for government-funded treatment and educational services
under EAHCA between the ages of three and twenty-one, inclusive. 20 U.S.C, § 1411(a)(1)(A)
(1982).
116. Courts and commentators have suggested that Congress' ultimate goal in enacting EAHCA
was to enable handicapped children to achieve self-sufficiency and independence whenever possible.
Armstrong v. Kline, 476 F. Supp. 583, 603 (E.D. Pa. 1979); see Comment, Self-Sufficiency Under the
Education for All Handicapped Children Act: A Suggested Judicial Approach, 1981 DuKE L.J. 516.
But see Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 192 (1982) (Congress merely intended states to
provide handicapped children with meaningful access to public education); supra notes 26-28 (dis-
cussing Rowley).
117. See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
118. That courts created two new Anderson-type exceptions to the no-damages rule in 1983, see
supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text, further indicates that the conventional approach to
awarding reimbursement for the cost of a child's interim placement requires revision.
119. See supra notes 78-84 & 103-07 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
121. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes. 33-34 and accompanying text.
123. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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their child in an unapproved setting. 24  The Brookline "prevailing
party" rule1 25 permits a court to assign financial responsibility for the
child's interim placement costs on the basis of EAHCA's substantive
provisions, in accordance with Congress' intent. This rule also encour-
ages thoughtful action by parents and school officials both prior to and
during a placement dispute by ensuring that each party will bear the
costs of its own poor judgment.126
Judicial resolution of a dispute over the proper educational placement
of a handicapped child has a major impact on the interests of the parents,
the school district, and the child. The enormous costs of providing a
beneficial education to a child who requires a residential placement could
quickly bankrupt a typical family.' 27 These costs could also disrupt the
efforts of a school district to educate all of its students properly. Most
importantly, because handicapped children must overcome exceptional
obstacles in the few years during which they are eligible for state-funded
educational services, 28 theirs is truly a case in which justice delayed is
justice denied. 29 The Brookline framework is far more effective than
other conventional approaches in providing courts with the flexibility to
resolve the tensions between these competing interests and thus make
meaningful Congress' promise to the nation's handicapped children.
130
David E. Schoenfeld
124, See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
127. See supra note 10.
128. See supra note 115.
129. "[D]elay in resolving matters regarding the education of a handicapped child is extremely
detrmental to his development. The interruption or lack of the required services can result in a
substantial setback to the child's development." 121 CONG. REc. 37,416 (1975) (statement of Sen.
Williams).
130. "[EAHCA] promises handicapped children the educational opportunity that has long been
considered the right of every other American child." 121 CONG. REc. 37,410 (1975) (statement of
Sen. Randolph).
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